I. INTRODUCTION
The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.
-Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
1
[A] page of history is worth a volume of logic.
2
These quotes are familiar and famous aphorisms of Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. They warn against an overly formalistic approach to the law, characterized by rote recitation of blackand-white legal rules and no consideration of the real world within which such legal rules operate. These warnings have not been heeded in the legal context of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which protects individuals from discrimination on the basis of race by any program or entity receiving federal funding.
Imagine, now, that a hypothetical School A receives funding from the United States Department of Education. Suppose School A has a policy, governing the distribution of these federal funds, that prohibits distribution of funds to any student organization composed primarily of racial minorities-in other words, if a majority of the members of a given student organization are racial minorities, then it will not receive any funding from the school. Most people would find such a policy to be repugnant to public policy and would be unsurprised to learn that a KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 private individual could bring suit under Title VI to enforce its protection against the discrimination.
3
Imagine, however, that School A tweaks its policy slightly. Instead of expressly basing its policy on race, suppose that it bases the policy on the size of the student organization. For example, the policy may prohibit the distribution of funds to any student organization that has a total membership of less than one percent of the school's total population. This policy may seem innocuous on its face. The policy may, however, have the same effect as the policy expressly based on race-that is, no funding for student organizations composed primarily of racial minorities. School A may be racially homogenous, and student organizations composed primarily of minorities may not have a total membership equal to or greater than one percent of School A's total population. Perhaps School A tweaked its policy in this way to achieve the same result without expressly basing its policy on race, thereby avoiding suit under Title VI. Surely such a policy is no less repugnant to public policy than one expressly based on race, particularly when the underlying motive for each policy is the same.
As it turns out, private individuals may bring suit under Title VI only to challenge policies that expressly (intentionally) discriminate on the basis of race. 4 Title VI does not reach a policy that has a disproportionally adverse (disparate) impact on particular racial groups, so long as the policy does not intentionally discriminate on the basis of race-such as the second hypothetical policy outlined above. Title VI does, however, direct federal agencies distributing federal funds-such as the Department of Education-to pass regulations effectuating the goal, or purpose, of Title VI. 5 Suppose that the Department of Education, pursuant to this directive, has passed a regulation prohibiting policies that have a disparate impact on particular racial groups. Such regulations are common, 6 but the United States Supreme Court has held that private individuals cannot bring suit under Title VI to enforce them. 7 This appears to allow School A to achieve its discriminatory objective by merely masking its discriminatory intent. This approach to Title VI fails to consider the real-world context in which legal rules operate, which is precisely the evil that Justice Holmes warned against. This Comment advocates an alternative mechanism for enforcing regulations that prohibit policies having a disparate impact on certain racial groups: the § 1983 action.
8
Use of § 1983 to enforce disparate impact regulations would replace an overly formalistic approach to Title VI with a functional approach that better meets the overall goals and purpose of Title VI and fits within existing precedent. Furthermore, adoption of this functionalist approach is warranted, because the current, overly formalistic approach is based on an untenable distinction between intentional and disparate impact discrimination.
Part II provides an overview of the areas of law pertinent to this Comment-Title VI and § 1983. 9 Part II.A outlines the relevant statutory provisions. Part II.B examines case law that is relevant to the statutory provisions outlined in Part II.A. Part II.C discusses the circuit split that has developed over the application of § 1983 to enforce federal regulations promulgated under Title VI.
Part III analyzes the justification for using § 1983 to enforce regulations prohibiting disparate impact discrimination. Part III.A examines the functionalist virtues of allowing § 1983 actions to enforce disparate impact regulations. Part III.B notes that allowing such use of § 1983 fits within existing precedent. Part III.C demonstrates that such a use of § 1983 is both justified and needed because the current state of Title VI law is based on an untenable distinction between intentional and disparate impact discrimination. Finally, Part IV concludes by briefly summarizing these arguments and advocating, once more, for the use of § 1983 to enforce regulations prohibiting disparate impact discrimination. Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section [601] . . . with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken.
11
Section 602's reference to § 601-directing federal agencies to promulgate regulations effectuating the provisions of § 601-makes clear that the two provisions do not operate wholly independently of one another. As § 602 regulations are to be promulgated to effectuate the provisions of § 601, they may, in some sense, elucidate the content of § 601. Section 602 regulations therefore cannot be understood without reference to § 601 and how the regulations are intended to effectuate those provisions. Simply put, § 601 may be understood as the end goal and § 602 regulations as the means by which to accomplish it.
Pursuant to § 602, several federal departments and agencies have issued rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability prohibiting funding recipients from utilizing "criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because 10. Id. § 2000d . 11. Id. § 2000d of their race, color, or national origin."
12
These regulations prohibit disparate impact discrimination by entities receiving federal funding from a federal department or agency having such a regulation.
The Supreme Court has held that an implied private cause of action may be used to enforce § 601, but not § 602 disparate impact regulations. 13 Although there is no private cause of action to enforce the regulations passed pursuant to § 602, there may be other mechanisms by which private individuals can seek enforcement of those regulations. Beyond Cannon's focus on legislative history, it also considered the statutory language of Title IX-and, by extension, Title VI-to be crucial to its holding that the statute contained an implied private cause of action.
32 For a statute to contain a private cause of action, the statute must first confer a personal right, which the private cause of action is intended to enforce. 33 Both Title VI and Title IX confer a personal right. 34 Crucial to this determination was the fact that the language of both statutes focuses on the class for whose benefit they were enacted.
35
The language of Title VI and Title IX focuses on the benefitted class and its protection-"No person . . . shall . . . be subjected to discrimination"-and is different from a hypothetical statute that simply prohibits the recipients of federal funds from discriminating on the basis of race or sex. 36 The language of such a hypothetical statute would not create a personal right and would counsel against finding an implied private cause of action for its enforcement.
37
Statutory language conferring a personal right upon members of a benefitted classpotentially enforceable by a private cause of action-almost certainly has to be phrased in terms that focus on the benefitted class. 38 Because both Title VI and Title IX are phrased in such language, the Court found that they conferred a personal right upon members of the benefitted class and went on to imply a private cause of action to enforce that conferred right. itself to the provisions of Title VI. 50 Both the Departments of Justice and Transportation had promulgated regulations, pursuant to § 602, prohibiting funding recipients from administering the funds in a manner that had the effect of discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national origin.
51
These regulations prohibited disparate impact, in addition to intentional, discrimination.
52 Sandoval brought suit seeking to enjoin the English-only policy. 53 Sandoval argued that the Englishonly policy had the effect of discriminating against non-English speakers on the basis of national origin, in violation of the disparate impact regulations promulgated pursuant to § 602. 54 Both the district court and the Eleventh Circuit ruled in favor of Sandoval, and an appeal to the Supreme Court followed.
55
As an initial matter, the Supreme Court took as given three aspects of Title VI.
56 First, the Court found it well settled that an implied private cause of action is available to enforce § 601 of Title VI.
57 Second, the Court's precedents made clear that § 601 prohibits only intentional discrimination-not disparate impact discrimination.
58 Third, the Court assumed that § 602 regulations-like those at issue in Sandoval-could validly prohibit disparate impact discrimination, even though § 601 permits it and prohibits only intentional discrimination.
59
The issue, then, was whether an implied private cause of action was available to enforce the valid disparate impact regulations promulgated pursuant to § 602.
60
The Court began its analysis by rejecting the claim that the Court's precedents required it to find that an implied private cause of action existed to enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations. interpreted its precedents to hold only that an implied private cause of action is available to enforce Title VI's ban on intentional discrimination. 62 The Court's precedents were silent on-or had never reached-the issue of whether the implied private cause of action extended to § 602 regulations prohibiting disparate impact discrimination.
63 Thus, precedent did not require the Court to find that the implied private cause of action extended to those regulations.
The Court then considered whether Congress intended for a private cause of action to enforce § 602 regulations prohibiting disparate impact discrimination.
64
The Court, given its assumptions about Title VI, 65 ultimately concluded that Congress had not so intended. 66 The private cause of action to enforce § 601's prohibition on intentional discrimination, according to the Court, undoubtedly extended to § 602 regulations also prohibiting intentional discrimination.
67 Because § 601 prohibits intentional discrimination, § 602 regulations prohibiting the same were deemed an authoritative construction of § 601.
68 "A Congress that intends [ § 601] to be enforced through a private cause of action," the Court reasoned, "intends the authoritative interpretation of [ § 601] to be so enforced as well." 69 Section 601, however, prohibits only intentional discrimination.
70
The Court therefore found that § 602 regulations prohibiting disparate impact discrimination are not authoritative constructions of, and do not apply to, § 601. 71 Rather, they prohibit a type of discrimination that § 601 permits.
72
Because of this, the Court found it "clear that the private right of action to enforce § 601 does not include a private right to enforce" § 602 regulations prohibiting disparate impact discrimination.
73
A private cause of action to enforce § 602 regulations prohibiting disparate impact discrimination-a type of discrimination permitted by § 601-"must come, if at all, from the independent force of § 602." The Court held that congressional intent is the dispositive factor in determining whether § 602 contains an implied private cause of action to enforce disparate impact regulations promulgated thereunder.
75
If Congress did not intend to provide such a remedy, the Court cannot imply or create it, even if such a remedy is desirable as a matter of public policy or appears compatible with Title VI as a whole. 76 This reasoning exemplifies the Court's overly formalistic approach to Title VI. Only an overly formalistic approach would prohibit private enforcement by adhering to a legal rule that mandates a finding of congressional intent to create such a remedy, even though private enforcement is perfectly compatible with Title VI-in fact, private enforcement would further the overall goals and purpose of Title VI, as § 602 regulations are promulgated to effectuate the antidiscrimination provision of § 601.
Under this overly formalistic approach, the Sandoval Court found that the text and structure of Title VI evinces no congressional intent to provide a private cause of action to enforce the disparate impact regulations promulgated under § 602. 77 The language focusing on Title VI's protected class, which was crucial to Cannon's holding that § 601 confers federal rights and contains a private cause of action to enforce those rights, 78 is absent from § 602. 79 Instead, the language of § 602 focuses on the federal agencies that distribute federal funds and regulate the recipients, which, according to the Court, evinces no intent to confer rights, much less a private cause of action to enforce them. 80 Furthermore, the Court interpreted § 602 to limit federal agencies to "effectuat[ing] rights already created by § 601."
81 Congress therefore could not have intended a private cause of action to enforce rights created independent of § 601, such as those rights created by § 602 disparate impact regulations.
82
In addition to the text of § 602, the Court found that its structure counseled against finding an implied private cause of action. In Blessing v. Freestone, the Supreme Court reiterated that a § 1983 action may be maintained only for violation of a federal right, not merely violation of a federal statute. 119 The Blessing Court then recognized three factors that the Court must consider in determining whether a statute or statutory provision gives rise to a federal right.
120
The first of these factors is whether Congress intended the statutory provision at issue to benefit the plaintiff.
121 Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right protected by the statutory provision is sufficiently well-defined to be judicially enforceable.
122
Lastly, the statutory provision giving rise to the federal right must clearly impose a binding obligation on the states-that is, the statutory provision must be phrased as mandatory. The Gonzaga Court also established the relationship between implied private causes of action and § 1983 actions. 128 The Court first dealt with the issue of determining whether a statutory provision confers a federal right. The Court rejected the argument that a statutory provision gives rise to a federal right so long as Congress intended for the statutory provision to "benefit" putative plaintiffs.
129
Instead, a statutory provision confers a federal right, enforceable under § 1983, only if Congress "unambiguously" intends to do so. 130 The focus must be on congressional intent to confer a right, which is something more than a benefit or interest.
131
In reaching this conclusion, the Gonzaga Court recognized that the three Blessing factors for determining whether a statutory provision confers a federal right, enforceable by a § 1983 action, had created much confusion. 132 The Blessing factors had been interpreted to allow a § 1983 claim "so long as the plaintiff falls within the general zone of interest that the statute is intended to protect." Gonzaga casts doubt upon-or, perhaps, rejects-this premise, as it requires a showing of congressional intent to create a right. 148 Proving congressional intent to create a right is more burdensome than satisfying the Blessing factors, but it is identical to the initial inquiry in determining whether a federal statute contains an implied private cause of action. Although § 1983 plaintiffs need not prove congressional intent to create a private remedy, they, like plaintiffs advocating for an implied private cause of action, must prove congressional intent to create a right in the first instance.
In Gonzaga, the Court ultimately held that the statutory provisions at issue-the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act's (FERPA's) nondisclosure provisions 149 -do not evince a congressional intent to create, or confer, rights and therefore are not enforceable by a § 1983 action.
150 First, the Court noted that FERPA's nondisclosure provisions do not contain any "rights-creating" language that is crucial to finding that Congress intended to create a right, whether it be enforceable by an implied private cause of action or § 1983. 151 The language of FERPA's nondisclosure provisions focuses not on the benefitted class, but on the Secretary of Education and how she is to distribute the funds. 152 The Court's conclusion that FERPA's nondisclosure provisions confer no individual right was further supported by the fact that those provisions speak in terms of a recipient's policy or practice, rather than individual instances, of disclosure.
154 This "policy or practice" language suggests an aggregate, rather than individual, focus.
155
Statutory provisions with an aggregate focus cannot give rise to individual rights.
156
Congress also chose to expressly provide a mechanism for enforcing FERPA's nondisclosure provisions, which further supported the Court's conclusion that the nondisclosure provisions confer no right enforceable by a § 1983 action.
157
In FERPA, Congress expressly provided a relatively complex mechanism for federal review.
158 According to the Court, express provision of this relatively complex enforcement mechanism counseled against a finding that Congress intended to create an "individually enforceable private right[]." 159 Furthermore, FERPA was amended, four months after being enacted, to provide for a centralized review process and avoid conflicting, regional enforcements of the nondisclosure provisions. 160 The Court reasoned that if Congress intended FERPA to be uniformly enforced, and provided a centralized review process to ensure that it is, then it is unlikely Congress intended to create a right that individuals could enforce by § 1983 actions in state and federal courts nationwide, as that would surely lead to the nonuniform enforcement the amendment sought to avoid. rights, a § 1983 action may be used to enforce those rights. 163 In Wright, tenants claimed that Roanoke violated their federal statutory right to pay only a certain percentage of their income in rent. 164 Roanoke had done so by not including utility costs in its rent calculation, which tenants then had to pay in addition to rent. 165 Agency regulations, not the federal statute itself, defined rent to include a reasonable amount for utilities.
166
The Wright Court ultimately concluded that the regulations at issue created federal rights enforceable by § 1983. 167 Although Wright was decided before Blessing, the Court appears to have applied the factors later enunciated in Blessing to determine that the regulations created a right enforceable by § 1983. 168 To the extent Wright relies on the Blessing factors, it is unlikely to provide a basis for finding § 602 disparate impact regulations create rights enforceable by § 1983.
Gonzaga requires unambiguous congressional intent to create such a right and renders the Blessing factors relevant only insofar as they demonstrate such intent.
169
The Wright Court, however, did not rely solely on the Blessing factors, assigning weight to (1) the regulation at issue as a valid interpretation of the statute and (2) 
C. Use of § 1983 to Enforce Regulations Authorized by Statute: A Circuit Split
As previously noted, 173 although the Supreme Court in Sandoval held that federal regulations promulgated pursuant to § 602 of Title VI prohibiting disparate impact discrimination could not be enforced by an implied private cause of action, it appeared to leave open the possibility they could be enforced by a § 1983 action.
174 Indeed, this possibility has created a split in the circuit courts of appeal.
The Majority Position: § 1983 May Not Be Used to Enforce
Regulations Authorized by Statute A majority of the circuits to address the issue have held that disparate impact regulations promulgated under § 602-or other regulations that are authorized by a given statute-do not create individual rights and therefore are not enforceable by a § 1983 action.
a. Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit

In Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit,
175 the Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority (Sound Transit) was in charge of building a light rail line connecting an area in north Seattle with an airport in SeaTac, Washington. 176 The portion of the light rail line that was to pass through Seattle's Rainier Valley, a neighborhood populated predominantly by minorities, was to be built at street level, whereas other portions of the light rail line that were to pass through neighborhoods were to be elevated above street level or built underground. 177 The Ninth Circuit noted that, on one side of the split, the "Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that an agency regulation cannot create an individual federal right enforceable through § 1983." 185 According to the Ninth Circuit, each circuit on this side of the split had employed essentially the same reasoning.
186 Each circuit had looked to the Supreme Court's § 1983 cases for direction and found that the Court's key consideration in those cases was congressional intent-or lack thereof-to create the right that the plaintiff sought to enforce through § 1983.
187 These circuits understood the Court, in its § 1983 cases, to treat administrative regulations as "mere 'administrative interpretations of the statute.'" 188 As a result, these circuits interpreted the Court's § 1983 cases to establish "the principle that Congress creates rights by statute, and that valid regulations merely 'define' or 'flesh out' the contents of those rights." 189 Thus, according to these circuits, regulations cannot create individual federal rights independent of those created by the statute authorizing the regulations.
190
Each of the circuits that held federal regulations cannot create individual federal rights enforceable through § 1983, prior to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Save Our Valley, did so prior to the Supreme Court's decisions in Sandoval and Gonzaga. 191 The Ninth Circuit found In Samuels, the plaintiffs alleged that District of Columbia public housing officials had violated Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regulations.
201
The D.C. Circuit found that the HUD regulations at issue had the "full force and effect of federal law" because "they are issued under a congressional directive to implement specific statutory norms and they affect individual rights and obligations." 202 The D.C. Circuit also found that, under the Supreme Court's precedent, the "laws" clause of § 1983 is broad enough to support a § 1983 action to enforce "federal regulations adopted pursuant to a clear congressional mandate that have the full force and effect of law." 203 The D.C. Circuit pointed to Supreme Court precedent holding that such regulations-those adopted pursuant to a clear congressional mandate-have been recognized as part of the body of federal law.
204
The D.C. Circuit then cited Thiboutot 205 for the proposition that § 1983 provides a remedy for a violation of any federal law, not just some subsets of federal laws. 206 It is noteworthy that the D.C. Circuit decided Samuels in 1985 so it could only base its decision on cases decided before 1985. Obviously, the Supreme Court as well as lower courts have decided cases involving both Title VI and § 1983 since 1985. Some of these post-1985 cases may cast doubt on the validity of the D.C. Circuit's decision in Samuels, but not necessarily, and Samuels has not been overruled. Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit is not the only circuit to find that federal regulations 200. 770 F.2d 184, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1985 207 In Robinson, the plaintiffs challenged Kansas's school-financing scheme, claiming that the scheme and its enforcement had a discriminatory disparate impact on minority students and students who are not of United States origin. 208 The plaintiffs argued that this was a violation of § 602 disparate impact regulations and sought to enforce those regulations through a § 1983 action.
209
The Tenth Circuit first noted that the Supreme Court's decision in Sandoval prohibited a private cause of action under Title VI to enforce the § 602 disparate impact regulations. 210 The Tenth Circuit then plainly stated that the § 602 disparate impact regulations are enforceable by a § 1983 action brought against state officials and seeking prospective injunctive relief. 211 The Tenth Circuit, however, offered no explanation for why it found that the § 602 disparate impact regulations are enforceable by a § 1983 action.
212
III. ANALYSIS
Courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, should allow the use of a § 1983 action to enforce § 602 regulations prohibiting disparate impact discrimination. There are three primary reasons for this. First, the use of § 1983 actions to enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations replaces an overly formalistic approach to Title VI with a much more functionalist approach. This functionalist approach is much better able to meet the overall goals and purpose of Title VI. 207. 295 F.3d 1183 , 1187 (10th Cir. 2002 ). 208. Id. at 1186 . 209. Id. at 1187 . 210. Id. at 1186 -87. 211. Id. at 1187 he Tenth Circuit's holding on this point was not supported by a reasoned analysis" other than citing a comment from Justice Stevens's dissent).
Second, as a legal matter, use of § 1983 actions to enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations fits within the Supreme Court's precedents. Section 1983 may only be used to enforce federal rights secured by the Constitution and federal laws. It is plausible, given the text and structure of Title VI, that disparate impact regulations promulgated under § 602 establish or define individual federal rights enforceable by a § 1983 action.
Finally, use of the § 1983 action to enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations is warranted because the need for a mechanism to enforce those regulations arises in the first instance only because of an untenable distinction between "intentional" and "disparate impact" discrimination. Because it may be impossible to distinguish between intentional and disparate impact discrimination, it makes little sense to prevent only intentional discrimination.
A. A More Functionalist Approach Is Preferred to the Current, Overly Formalistic Approach Because it Better Achieves the Overall Goals and Purpose of Title VI
As outlined in Part II, the Supreme Court has set up a complex framework of legal rules governing Title VI. Under this framework, Title VI does not provide a private cause of action to enforce § 602 regulations prohibiting disparate impact discrimination. 213 Even if this proposition is accepted as settled law, a § 1983 action should be allowed to enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations. Allowing a § 1983 action to enforce such regulations represents a far more functionalist approach to the issue than the current, overly formalistic approach taken by the Supreme Court in the context of implied private causes of action. The more functionalist approach better achieves the overall goals and purpose of Title VI.
Before addressing any of the legal rules surrounding Title VI, it is helpful to understand the overall goals and purpose of Title VI. Such an understanding is helpful because legal rules governing Title VI should be formulated to further its overall goals and purpose, not run contrary to them. The legislative history of Title VI clearly demonstrates its overall goals and purpose.
According to Senator John Pastore, "[Title VI] has a simple purpose-to eliminate discrimination in federally financed programs." It is noteworthy that that there are no qualifications to the type of discrimination Congress sought to eliminate. President John F. Kennedy, in encouraging Congress to pass what would eventually become Title VI, stated the following:
Simple justice requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or results in racial discrimination. Direct discrimination by Federal, State, or local governments is prohibited by the Constitution. But indirect discrimination, through the use of Federal funds, is just as invidious; and it should not be necessary to resort to the courts to prevent each individual violation.
215
These statements make clear that the purpose of Title VI was, and is, to eliminate racial discrimination in federally financed programs. Neither statement contains an adjective-like "intentional"-modifying the type of discrimination Title VI was intended to eliminate. In fact, President Kennedy's statement demonstrates a clear intention to prohibit distribution of federal funds that results in racial discrimination-and spending that simply results in racial discrimination is precisely the disparate impact discrimination prohibited by § 602 disparate impact regulations.
Given the evidence in Senator Pastore's statement that Title VI was intended to eliminate all types of racial discrimination-not just intentional discrimination-and the evidence in President Kennedy's statement that Title VI was intended to eliminate even disparate impact discrimination, it is clear that Title VI was intended to be interpreted broadly. In other words, Title VI was to be interpreted so as to reach, and eliminate, all forms of racial discrimination, including disparate impact discrimination, in programs receiving federal funding. Thus, legal rules adopted to govern Title VI should further this purpose.
Because the Supreme Court in Sandoval foreclosed the possibility of an implied private cause of action in Title VI to enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations, 216 a § 1983 action should be allowed to enforce them. If neither an implied private cause of action nor a § 1983 action is available to enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations, there is no mechanism by which individuals may enforce the very regulations that are intended to protect them. Federally funded entities would be able to racially discriminate by distributing funds in a manner that simply 215. H.R. DOC. NO. 88-124, pt. 3, at 12 (1963) resulted in discrimination on the basis of race, so long as the funds were not expressly distributed on the basis of race in the first instance. The Sandoval Court, in its overly formalistic approach, failed to consider or appreciate this possibility and did nothing to further Title VI's overall purpose of eliminating all forms of racial discrimination in federally funded programs. Thus, a § 1983 action should be allowed to enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations and thereby better serve Title VI's overall goals and purpose.
B. Because Disparate Impact Regulations Promulgated Pursuant to § 602 Are Intended to Effectuate the Antidiscrimination Provision of § 601, Those Regulations Create Individual Federal Rights and Should Be Enforceable through § 1983
As a legal matter, the key inquiry in determining whether § 602 disparate impact regulations may be enforced by a § 1983 action involves a two-step analysis. First, one must consider whether § 602 disparate impact regulations create or define a federal right. As noted above, this requires, pursuant to Gonzaga v. Doe, unambiguous congressional intent to confer an individual federal right.
217 Second, one must consider whether the right is one for which § 1983 was intended to provide a remedy or enforcement mechanism.
218 As previously noted, however, if a federal right exists, § 1983 is presumed to be available as a remedy or enforcement mechanism.
219
Beginning with the text of Title VI, the statute itself draws no distinction between intentional and disparate impact discrimination. The statute prohibits only "discrimination" without any adjective.
220
The Supreme Court noted in Gonzaga that Title VI has been found to confer an individual right-the right to be free from the prohibited discrimination-because the text of the statute is focused on the protected class.
221 Thus, the Supreme Court, in a case that established a more stringent standard for determining whether a statute confers individual rights, cited Title VI, specifically, as an example of a statute that confers individual rights. 222 This, coupled with the fact that the text of Title VI does not limit the discrimination prohibition to intentional discrimination, clearly evinces a congressional intent to create a right to be free from all types of discrimination. Because this right includes the rights to be free from disparate impact discrimination, a § 1983 action should be available to enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations that create or define that right.
In foreclosing the availability of an implied private cause of action to enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations, the Sandoval Court accorded significant, if not dispositive, weight to the fact that the language of § 602 focuses on the regulating federal agencies, as opposed to § 601's focus on the class of persons protected by Title VI. 223 According to the Court's reasoning, statutory provisions focusing on the regulating agencies, rather than the protected class, evince no congressional intent to create rights. The need for a § 1983 action to enforce § 602 regulations prohibiting disparate impact discrimination arises only because of the distinction between intentional and disparate impact discrimination. If, in accord with the intent of Congress, the Supreme Court had broadly interpreted Title VI to reach and eliminate all forms of discrimination, then an implied private cause of action would be available to enforce the right to be free from both intentional and disparate impact discrimination. 228 The Supreme Court, however, has not interpreted Title VI in the broad manner its drafters intended.
As outlined above, the Supreme Court has held that § 601 of Title VI reaches only intentional discrimination. mechanism, such as § 1983, is needed to enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations. However, the distinction between intentional and disparate impact discrimination is untenable, and use of § 1983 to enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations is therefore warranted to ensure that both forms of discrimination are effectively prohibited. Intentional discrimination is understood to encompass any policy that expressly guides distribution of federal funds on the basis of race.
232
Disparate impact discrimination is understood to encompass policies that do not expressly guide distribution of federal funds on the basis of race but, nonetheless, result in a disproportionally adverse, or disparate, impact upon certain racial groups. 233 The first hypothetical policy in Part I-expressly distributing funds on the basis of race-is an example of so-called intentional discrimination. The second hypothetical policy in Part I-distributing funds based on the size of student organizations, but resulting in no funding to groups composed primarily of racial minorities-is an example of so-called disparate impact discrimination. Although the distinction between intentional and disparate impact discrimination may make sense as a logical matter, it is untenable as a practical matter. This is so because "intentional" speaks to a state of mind, but a state of mind may easily be disguised, leaving disparate impact as the only evidence of intentional discrimination.
An entity receiving federal funds may intentionally discriminate on the basis of race and yet do so without engaging in so-called intentional discrimination. Such an entity need only find a proxy for race and distribute funds based on that proxy. 234 The result would be that funds are distributed in a manner that results in racial discrimination-which is the definition of disparate impact discrimination. Disparate impact discrimination therefore can be intentional, which renders untenable, as a practical matter, the distinction between intentional and disparate impact discrimination. Even if one accepts the proposition that Title VI contains an implied private cause of action that reaches only intentional discrimination, it is undeniable that in at least some instances the only evidence of intentional discrimination is evidence of disparate impact on particular racial groups. 235 If, however, a prohibition on discrimination that merely results in racial discrimination is not enforceable by a private cause of action, then at least some instances of intentional discrimination cannot, and will not, be eliminated. Thus, there needs to be a private cause of action to enforce § 602 regulations prohibiting disparate impact regulations. Because the Sandoval Court has foreclosed the possibility of an implied private cause of action in Title VI to enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations, 236 a § 1983 action should be allowed to enforce such regulations.
IV. CONCLUSION
Legal rules, no matter how black and white they may appear, do not operate in a vacuum and may be subject to manipulation in the realworld context in which they operate. Such is the case with Title VI and the legal rules that flow from it. The Supreme Court has made clear that § 601 of Title VI reaches only intentional discrimination. As a result, the implied private cause of action contained in Title VI may only be used to enforce § 601's prohibition on intentional discrimination. The private cause of action that exists in Title VI cannot be used to enforce § 602 regulations prohibiting disparate impact discrimination. This leaves entities receiving federal funding free to engage in racial discrimination, so long as they are able to find a race-neutral proxy allowing them to do so. Because the purpose of Title VI is to protect individuals from discrimination based on race, color, or national origin, the law should not be overly formalistic and ignore real-world actors who are technically complying with the requirements of Title VI-by not intentionally discriminating based on race-but are undermining its very purpose-by adopting facially race-neutral policies that have a disparate impact on particular minority groups.
The § 1983 action is a viable alternative mechanism to enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations. The § 1983 action is intended as an enforcement mechanism for rights secured by federal statute. Title VI, a federal statute, confers upon individuals the right to be free from all types of discrimination.
This includes intentional forms of 235. See, e.g., Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007 , 1014 (2d Cir. 1980 ) (stating that sometimes discrimination can be inferred from disparate impact).
236. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288-89, 291 (2001) (finding that Congress did not intend to create a private cause of action and that absent congressional authorization, a regulation cannot create one).
